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Abstract:  
Previous research on electoral participation has paid little attention to 
turnout in developing countries. Even more understudied is the effect of mass 
media, as the main source of political information, on voter turnout in new 
democracies. This paper argues that voter turnout patterns in developing 
countries can be explained by extending the traditional rational voter model to 
include recent developments of the information theory of turnout. Embedding 
limited information, our theoretical framework suggests that media access and 
freedom affect turnout. We test our predictions in a sample of 60 developing 
countries over the period 1980-2005. We find that media penetration, as 
measured by radio ownership, fosters turnout, whereas newspapers 
circulation and television ownership are not significant. In addition, we show 
that when government controls the content of news, citizens are less prone to 
express their views at the polls. Finally, we highlight specific factors ‒political 
violence and external debt‒ that affect turnout in developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the third wave of democratization in the 1990s, elections are now 
common in developing countries.  However, beyond the widespread belief that the 
setting of regular elections is a real improvement per se, it seems us essential to 
understand how elections are supposed to bring about democracy, or rule according to 
the will of people.  
Electoral participation is one of the three main indicators of democratic 
performance (Powell, 1982).2 However, electoral turnout is declining in most 
democracies (Blais, 2000; Gray and Caul, 2000). Moreover, voter turnout varies 
considerably, both over time and across countries and individuals (Lassen, 2005). This 
variation is not random and electoral participation seems to be highly unequal and 
biased in favor of more privileged citizens ‒those with higher incomes, greater wealth 
and better education‒ and against less advantaged citizens (Lijphart, 1997). We suggest 
that this may prevent elections to properly perform their three key functions: (i) to 
discipline the elected officials by the threat of not being reappointed (accountability 
effect); (ii) to select competent individuals for public office (legitimacy effect); and, (iii) 
to reflect the preferences of a large spectrum of voters (representativeness effect). 
The accountability effect is straightforward. Elections affect the incentives facing 
politicians. The anticipation of not being reelected in the future leads elected officials 
not to shirk their obligations to the voters in the present (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; 
Fiorina, 1981; Manin, 1997). In this view, elections are seen as a sanctioning device that 
induces elected officials to act in the best interest of the people. However, one 
important condition that affects political accountability is the competitive electoral 
mechanism, and at the core of the electoral mechanism is the vote. The vote is the 
primary tool for citizens to make their governments accountable. If a large fraction of 
citizens don’t express their opinions, elections would create no incentives for 
politicians to espouse or implement policies in the public interest. In the mandate view, 
elections serve to select good policies or political leaders (Rogoff, 1990). There is a 
legitimacy effect as a government which has acquired power through winning an 
election has a mandate to implement its commitments and the wide recognition of this 
mandate reduces the ability of those opposed to these policies to block them. Thus, low 
and unequal turnout can reduce the perceived legitimacy of government. Finally, 
elections are seen as a representational instrument since they signaled the voters’ 
conflicting preferences. If turnout is unequal, the interest of some citizens are taken 
into account in policymaking more strongly than the interests of others. Indeed, 
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unequal electoral participation can distort the pattern of representation necessary for 
democratic responsiveness, leading to real effects on policy outcomes.3  
As a result, elections are a representational instrument and an effective mechanism 
to select and discipline politicians only if individuals show up at the polls to express 
their views. However, although electoral participation in developed countries has 
garnered considerable attention, voter turnout in developing countries has been largely 
ignored. This lack of attention is unfortunate since this issue is of first importance. 
Elections in developing countries have become a fundamental concern of the 
international community. Since aid was first used conditionally to promote “Structural 
Adjustment” in the 1980s, the international community has recognized that policy 
improvement is fundamental to development. During the 1990s, the approach to how 
good policies should be promoted shifted from conditionality, which was increasingly 
seen as both ineffective and unacceptable, to the promotion of democracy (Chauvet, 
Collier, 2008). Electorates rather than donors would coerce governments into good 
performance. At the core of the promotion of democracy was the promotion of 
elections: for example, in 2006 donors provided $500 million to finance elections in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Chauvet, Collier, 2008). Thus, worldwide there has 
been a drive to make governments more accountable to the needs of citizens. The 
governance agenda has been pushed by a range of actors from domestic to 
international NGOs through to the international financial organizations. As there is 
widespread consensus on the need to improve political accountability, the 
phenomenon of electoral participation needs to be better understood. Finally, 
developing countries provide an ideal context to study the determinants of electoral 
participation. In contrast to the relatively stable old democracies, developing countries 
exhibit far greater variance in economic performance, level of democracy and 
institutional arrangements.  
This paper proposes a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of political 
turnout in developing countries. More specifically, this study extends the traditional 
rational voter model to include recent developments of the information theory of 
turnout. Embedding limited information, our theoretical framework suggests that 
media access and freedom affect turnout. This question is particularly relevant in the 
context of developing countries. While high-income countries have high levels of 
media penetration and freedom, developing countries vary widely in terms of media 
access and freedom. We examine 307 national elections held in 60 developing 
countries, between 1980 and 2005. We find that media penetration, as measured by 
radio ownership, fosters turnout, whereas newspapers circulation and television 
ownership are not significant. In addition, we show that when government controls the 
content of news, citizens are less prone to express their views at the polls.  
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Of course, any attempts to specify the effects of media penetration and freedom 
will raise econometric difficulties. However, the patterns presented in this paper hold 
true even after controlling for a large set of factors. Moreover, while other studies on 
the effects of media in a large sample of countries (Islam, 2002; Leeson, 2008) use cross-
country data, we use panel data and discuss within-country evidence. Nevertheless, 
much work remains to be done in sorting out issues of causality, perhaps by figuring 
out appropriate instrumental variables.   
Our findings complement other recent research on the effects of media access and 
freedom. For example, Besley and Burgess (2002) find that higher newspapers 
circulation is associated with increased government responsiveness to shocks in India.4 
Djankov, Mcleish, Nenova and Shleifer (2003) find that private media ownership is 
associated with improved social outcomes; in contrast, where the media is state-
owned, they observe poorer education and health indicators. While the empirical 
literature is in its infancy, existing studies suggest that mass media make governments 
more accountable and responsive. In this paper, we argue that electoral participation 
may be the channel by which mass media improve government accountability. Media 
make citizens more politically knowledgeable and active. Politicians realize this, which 
creates an incentive for them to be accountable. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the evolution of 
voter turnout in established and new democracies. Then, we depict the raw 
relationship between media freedom and voter turnout in developing countries. 
Section 3 reviews previous theoretical and empirical work on the effect of information 
on voter turnout. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework and emphasizes the 
main hypotheses that we will test. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Unequal Participation: Some Stylized Facts 
This section starts with an overview of how turnout is defined in previous studies. 
Given the heterogeneity observed in the measure of this variable, this enquiry is 
essential. Then, we provide an overview of voter turnout around the world since 1945 
and we investigate the raw relationship between media freedom and voter turnout in 
developing countries. 
 
2.1. Measuring Voter Turnout  
Defining turnout as the absolute number of people voting in the election or as the 
share of the population that has cast its vote is obviously correct. However, when 
turnout is defined as a share of ‘the population’, a clear definition of this population 
variable is required. Did one take the ratio of the number of voters to the entire 
population, to the voting age population, to the eligible population or to the number of 
                                                           
4
 Using panel data from Indian states for 1952-1992, they look at two policy response systems: first, 
public distribution of food as a response to falls in food production associated with droughts, and second, 
spending on calamity relief as a response to crop damage caused by floods.  
5 
 
people registered to vote? This affects the size of ‒and quite likely the variation in‒ 
turnout rates and thus may affect the estimation results.  
Almost all previous studies define turnout as some sort of ratio.5 However, many of 
these analyses fail to provide a clear and complete definition of the denominator (Geys, 
2006). Therefore, we suggest to clarify the different definitions and to discuss 
advantages and drawbacks in using these calculations as the basis for turnout statistics 
particularly in the context of developing countries. 
Many studies use the percentage of registered voters that vote (e.g., Blais and 
Carty, 1990, Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Blais, 2000; Mattila, 2002). This measure 
presents two key drawbacks. First, in some countries registration figures are inaccurate 
(as in Guatemala)6 or unavailable, and sometimes voter registers are not used (as in 
South Africa in 1994). Thus, the registration rate sometimes exceeds the estimated 
voting age population. The explanation for this apparent anomaly usually lies in the 
inaccuracy of the electoral register. The register can also under-represent the true size 
of the eligible voter pool if, as is often the case, it fails to record the names of new 
voters who have come of age or migrated to an area. Both of these scenarios represent 
relatively common problems facing electoral administrators around the world, 
particularly in developing countries (Gratschew, Pintor, 2002). Second, we argue that 
there is an even more fundamental problem with using registered voters as the 
denominator when measuring turnout. Indeed, the act of voting actually requires two 
separate acts, namely registering to vote and voting per se. If a causal force is to 
generate greater turnout, it needs to motivate citizens to first register and then follow 
through with a vote. Obviously, the two acts are correlated since citizens who are 
sufficiently motivated to register will also be more inclined to vote. If registration and 
voting are correlated, however, then the ratio of voters to registered voters is a biased 
measure of citizen’s motivation to vote (Endersby, Krieckhaus, 2008). We have 
essentially eliminated all citizens who were not sufficiently motivated to register in the 
first place, and this drops from the analysis a large part of the variation in citizens’ 
willingness to engage in voting behavior. As we are ultimately interested in knowing 
why some citizens vote and others do not, it does not make sense to drop the large 
number of citizens who decide to forgo both voting and registration. Put differently, 
the act of registering is a concrete sign that a citizen does prefer to vote, and is 
therefore a critical intervening process that lies between the underlying preferences 
and the act of voting itself. When we divide total votes by the registration rolls we 
control for the underlying preferences. Given that these preferences are presumably 
much of the reason that citizens ultimately vote, we do not want to control for such 
preferences but rather we wish to understand how they are determined by other 
variables. This problem is mitigated in many countries where registration is 
mandatory, but even mandatory registration may not motivate otherwise apathetic 
                                                           
5
 For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on voter turnout, see Geys (2006). 
6
 Current estimates show that about 25 percent of all inscriptions are incomplete or out of date, or relate to 
deceased persons and migrants (Boneo, Torres-Rivas, 2000). 
6 
 
citizens to register. Mandatory requirements are not still enforced, and registration 
does in fact vary substantially from country to country. Thus, mandatory registration is 
a spectrum ranging from a symbolic, but basically impotent, law to a government 
which systematically implements sanctions against non-voting citizens.   
Various other studies divides the number of voters by the voting age population 
(e.g., Powell, 1980, 1986; Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Katz, 1997; Norris, 
2002). The denominator thus leaves out those that have not yet reached the age at 
which one is legally allowed ‒or in some cases obliged‒ to vote (18 years in most 
countries). Therefore, voting age population can provide a clearer picture of 
participation as it may signal a problem with the voters’ register or registration system. 
However, voting age population suffers two shortcomings. First, voting age population 
is simply estimated based on the total national population. So, it is not able to exclude 
those within a population who may not be eligible for registration or voting due to 
factors such as non-citizenship, mental competence or imprisonment. For example, 
turnout data is artificially low in countries with a large alien population (Blais, 
Dobrzynska, 1998). Second, it is likely that population statistics are somewhat 
inaccurate, since they are approximated through census data. Indeed, registration 
figures are, in most cases, more often updated than population figures (Gratschew, 
Pintor, 2002).  
Very few studies regard only that part of the population that is eligible to vote (e.g., 
Matsusaka, Palda, 1993). This not only disregards individuals under the legal voting 
age, but also ineligible felons and noncitizens. Thus, eligible population appears to be 
the best measure to compute turnout rates. However, preference of one ratio over the 
other is often guided by data availability and eligible population figures are not 
available for most developing countries. For that reason, we will use the percentage of 
voters on the voting age population to measure voter turnout in our empirical analysis. 
 
2.2. Worldwide Turnout 
Figure 1 examines the evolution of voter turnout since 1945 for both parliamentary 
and presidential elections. It is based on the International Institute of Democracy and 
Electorate Assistance database of elections, which covers 170 independent states and 
includes data for 1256 parliamentary elections and 412 presidential elections. As 
aforementioned, voter turnout as a percentage of registration is higher than turnout as 
a percentage of the voting age population. Figure 1 shows a notable decline in voter 
turnout since the mid-1980s, whether turnout is measured as a percentage of 
registration or as a percentage of the voting age population. However, we suggest that 
this global trend may not be valid in new democracies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 
Registration: registered voters. 
Source: International IDEA
 
2.3. New and Established Democracies
Figure 2 – DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES
       Source: International IDEA voter turnout database.
 
 
Figure 2 reveals that high
established democracies. Established democracies have seen a slow but steady decline 
in turnout since the 1970s. During the 1970s, however, as a result of democratization 
– TURNOUT OVER TIME 
VAP: voting age population.  
 voter turnout database. 
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-turnout countries are neither exclusively new nor 
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movement, other states experienced an increase in voter turnout, peaking at about 80 
percent. The current turnout in new democracies is about 70 percent, lower than the 73 
percent in established democracies. 
 
2.4. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout 
Figure 3 depicts the raw relationship between media freedom and voter turnout in 
60 developing countries. To investigate this pattern, we use the International IDEA 
data on electoral participation. Voter turnout is measure as the number of votes cast 
divided by the voting age population. To measure media freedom, we use Freedom 
House index of media freedom.7 Each country is rated in three areas of potential state 
influence over the media: legal environment, political influences and economic 
pressures, to determine an overall score. This score is rescaled from 0 to 1 where a 
higher score means more freedom. For each country, we take the average values of 
voter turnout and media freedom associated with each election between 1980 and 2005. 
We restrict our analysis to elections held after 1980 as data on media freedom are not 
available before this year.  
 
 
Figure 3 – MEDIA FREEDOM AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
According to Figure 3, a freer media is associated with higher voter turnout in 
developing countries. Thus, citizens seem to be more politically active when 
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government doesn’t control the content of news. This first result suggests that media-
provided information affects turnout in developing countries. In the next sections, we 
propose to investigate this relationship more closely. 
 
3. Related Literature 
The literature on voter turnout is voluminous, and no attempt to survey it will be 
made here. Recent surveys and discussions of the literature are provided in Blais (2000, 
2006) and Mutsusaka and Palda (1999). We focus only on studies that analyze the effect 
of information on voter turnout. After a look at theoretical work linking information 
and turnout, we review previous empirical studies. 
 
3.1. Why being Informed Affects Voting Behavior 
Individuals are constrained both by a lack of knowledge about the different 
consequences of their decisions and their limited intellectual capacity to analyze all 
available options. In other words, the information level of the population is likely to be 
much less than complete. Recent formal models incorporate this idea of limited 
information in a theory of voter turnout. 
Two works propose a decision-theoretical model of voter turnout. Matsusaka 
(1995) embeds an information theory in the standard rational voter model. He takes as 
given that each citizen is predisposed to vote, and then focuses on how information can 
lead some to follow through on this inclination and others to abstain. The key link is 
that a person’s expected benefit from casting a decisive vote is increasing in her 
certainty that she is supporting the best candidates. As a result, the person is more 
likely to vote as she becomes surer about which way to vote. Confidence in a voting 
decision is increased by raw information about candidates and knowledge about the 
model of the world. Thus, as the price of information falls and knowledge rises, a 
person’s ability of voting goes up. As stressed by Matsusaka, it is the voter’s subjective 
belief about his information level that guides participation, and this can differ from 
objective measures of political knowledge. Larcinese (2006) adds that the amount of 
political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign 
depends, among other things, on prior ideological beliefs about candidates. Voters that 
are ex ante indifferent about the candidates attach little value to information because 
they perceive that voting will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological 
also attach little value to information because they think that the news would hardly 
change their opinion. Thus, high incentives to be informed can be found at 
intermediate levels of ideological strength. Moreover, Larcinese (2006) argues that the 
impact of increased political knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: new information 
increases the probability of voting of indifferent voters but decreases that of very 
ideological voters.  
Another effort at incorporating information in a model of voter turnout was made 
by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999). They propose a game-theoretic model of 
voting, where turnout decision is influenced by the information structure facing 
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prospective voters. The election they consider is a referendum on whether to adopt a 
new policy instead of the status quo. In the model, voting is costless for all agents and, 
thus, abstention cannot be explained by differences in the cost of voting.8 The 
difference in the voting behavior among agents comes from the presence of 
asymmetric information: some agents are informed, some uninformed. The central 
result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) is that it can be optimal for uninformed 
independent voters to abstain from voting even though they may prefer one alternative 
to the other. The reason is that by abstaining they effectively defer the choice to the 
informed voters who, by definition, vote for the correct policy. When there is a large 
number of voters, this will lead to the correct policy being chosen (Feddersen, 
Pesendorfer, 1997). The central empirical prediction is that more informed agents 
should vote in the election, while uninformed agents should abstain from voting. At 
the aggregate level, increasing the expected fraction of informed voters will, then, lead 
to a lower level of abstention.  
The aforementioned models cannot explain the mere existence of voter turnout. In 
fact, they assume some predisposition to vote and focus on the factors that affect 
whether citizens translate this preference into action. Therefore, information-based 
models don’t predict an actual level of turnout, but rather explain turnout at the 
margins (Matsusaka, 1995). Nevertheless, the great advantage of the information 
theory of voter turnout is its ability to explain most of the empirical regularities 
identified by previous studies in established democracies. For example, campaign 
spending and personal contact by campaign workers increase voter turnout because 
they provide inexpensive information. Public employees and farm owners are more 
likely to vote as they interact frequently with the government, giving them cheaper 
access to information. Long time residents in a community are more likely to vote than 
people who recently move since they have better contextual knowledge to evaluate the 
local impact of policies. A person’s age is positively correlated with her probability of 
voting as age brings knowledge that is useful in processing information. 
From this perspective, mass media and education seem to be important 
determinants of voter turnout patterns. Education brings knowledge that is useful in 
processing information. Mass media is the main source of political information. As 
media coverage increases, electoral participation is expected to rise. In the same spirit, 
media freedom may increase voter turnout since it improves the quality of political 
information.  
 
3.2. Empirical Studies 
Previous empirical analyses examine the effect of information on voter turnout 
from two main angles. One body of research concentrates on education. Two recent 
articles investigate the causal effect of education on voter turnout: following a 
literature in labor economics, Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) 
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use U.S. state government variation in compulsory schooling laws as instruments to 
identify the effect of education on voter turnout and other aspects of civic 
participation. Both studies find that more education causes a higher propensity to vote. 
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos further find that education also implies greater 
political knowledge and greater interest in politics. However, this leaves open the 
question of exactly how education increases turnout. Several reasons are possible, 
including lowering costs of information processing but also through reducing 
alienation and increasing compliance with social norms through socialization. A key 
result of Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2004) is that the effect of education on 
turnout in the United States disappears when conditioning on registered voters, 
suggesting that the role of education is to overcome registration barriers. Moreover, 
there is no effect of education on turnout in the United Kingdom, where most voters 
are registered through local governments. Similarly, Lassen (2005) uses survey data 
from Copenhagen referendum on decentralization and he finds no direct effect of 
education on voter turnout, but he shows some evidence of an indirect effect, through 
information. These findings suggest that education enters directly into the calculus of 
voting by reducing expected utility costs associated with information acquisition and 
processing, rather than through contextual or socialization effects. Some studies 
investigate the effect of education on voter turnout in developing countries. However, 
their findings are contradictory. On the one hand, Lesson (2008) finds that education 
has a positive impact on political participation in 13 Central and Eastern European 
countries. In two states in northern India, Krishna (2006) shows that education is more 
important for democratic participation than wealth and social status. On the other 
hand, Fornos, Power and Garand (2004) find that education doesn’t affect voter 
turnout in Latin American countries from 1980 to 2000. In the same vein, Birner, 
Kamijon, Khan and Qureshi (2008) analysis suggests that, in Pakistan, more educated 
people are less likely to vote. These authors argue that one possible explanation for this 
finding is that, in a clientelistic environment, the votes of less educated people tend to 
be cheaper to purchase by candidates, and less educated people are more vulnerable to 
intimidation by authorities. 
Another strand of research focuses on the effect of media coverage and freedom. 
Several studies have discussed the role of media-provided information in informing 
the electorate. In an analysis of the effects of information on New Deal spending in the 
United States, Strömberg (2004) finds that regions that were more informed, measured 
by a higher share of radio ownership, had higher turnout in general elections. In 
addition, regions with a high voter turnout are more successful in attracting 
redistributive spending. Similarly, Prat and Strömberg (2005) use panel evidence from 
Sweden to measure the effect of the introduction of commercial broadcasting on voter 
information and turnout. They find that people who start watching commercial TV 
news increase their level of political knowledge and their political participation more 
than those who do not. In contrast, Gentzkow (2006) finds that television’s introduction 
significantly reduced voter turnout in the United States. Gentzkow argues that 
12 
 
television’s introduction caused substitution away from newspapers and radio, and so 
reduced citizens’ knowledge of politics. Furthermore, since television is a dramatic 
improvement in the amount of entertainment available to households, it may have also 
reduced the total time devoted to news consumption. Other studies examine the 
relationship between press freedom and political participation. Studying 13 Central 
and Eastern European countries, Leeson (2008) shows that low media freedom is 
strongly associated with poor political knowledge, low political participation, and low 
voter turnout.  
To sum up, empirical findings on the effect of education on voter turnout in 
developing countries are not conclusive. Moreover, empirical studies on the impact of 
media coverage and freedom don’t investigate the effect of mass media on electoral 
participation in developing countries.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework 
Consensus on the determinants of turnout is less overwhelming in the case of 
developing countries (Blais, 2006). The question addressed in this paper is therefore 
how the determinants that have been identified in the literature, particularly the 
information, play out in developing countries, where citizens are on average less 
habituated to vote than citizens in advanced democracies, where socio-economic 
circumstances are less favorable, and where the institutional context is likely to be less 
stable and predictable than in advanced democracies. In Section 4.1, we present a 
theoretical framework, based on the rational voter approach, which incorporates the 
recent developments of the information theory of voter turnout. In addition, we 
operationalize this model in the context of developing countries. In Section 4.2, we sum 
up the different hypotheses that we will test in our empirical analysis. 
 
4.1. Rational-Choice Perspective and Voter Turnout 
Understanding the individual voter’s decision whether or not to turn out to vote 
has been a major challenge for public choice. From a pure rational choice perspective, 
voting is an instrumental act, i.e. a means to influence the election outcome. Thus, 
voting is irrational because the probability of affecting the election outcome with one’s 
vote is close to zero in most elections and the potential benefits of voting are always 
lower than the costs of voting. Indeed, voters have to spend time and resources to 
become well informed on the relative quality of the candidates, decide who to vote for 
and go to the polls on the Election Day. Nevertheless, citizens do turn out and vote, 
giving rise to the so-called “paradox of voting” (Downs, 1957).9 In trying to explain this 
paradox, many authors have critically examined the underlying motivations of the 
individual voter. The most fruitful approaches start from the observation ‒made by 
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Downs himself‒ that voting may not be instrumental in all circumstances: voting could 
be motivated by factors other than the desire to determine the outcome of the election. 
For example, voting may serve as a means to create social solidarity or to express 
political preferences. Downs’ suggestion for resolving the voting paradox stipulated 
that people vote because of a sense of civic duty. In this case, voters may be gratified by 
the act of voting rather than the outcome. Later authors have paid still more attention 
to voting’s expressive content. Individual voters thereby derive utility from the very 
act of expressing their political preferences or their solidarity with a peer group or 
from performing an ethical act.10  
We propose to develop a theoretical framework based on the traditional rational 
voter model in the context of developing countries. There is considerable literature on 
the merits and weaknesses of rational-choice models of voter turnout (see Green and 
Shapiro, 1996; Blais, Lapp and Young, 2000). However, even fundamental critics of the 
rational choice model cannot ignore its usefulness in estimating the marginal impacts 
of various political and socioeconomic factors on voter turnout. As Green and Shapiro 
(1996) indicate, one advantage of the rational-choice perspective over competing 
explanatory approaches is the ability to estimate the marginal impacts of various 
factors on voter turnout. Those estimates can then be used to make plausible 
predictions about the effects of changing, for example, the costs of voting on voter 
turnout. 
According to the famous calculus-of-voting model developed by Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968), voters operate rationally, and their decisions whether to vote are 
based on the expected utility of the vote. The model takes the following form: 
      R = PB – C + D,            (1) 
where R is the net satisfaction that an individual receives from voting. This depends on 
the instrumental benefits (PB), costs (C) and expressive benefits (D) from voting. The 
instrumental benefits term (PB) is the product of two components. The first (P) gives 
the probability that one’s vote is decisive, meaning that it leads one’s preferred party to 
victory. The second factor (B) is the instrumental net benefit, which gives the utility 
gain that is realized when one’s preferred party comes into power. B thus corresponds 
with the difference between the utility from the preferred party’s platform minus the 
utility from the opponent party’s platform. The larger this difference, the higher are the 
potential gains from casting a vote. The costs C comprise the information costs as well 
as the opportunity costs of heading to the polls. Finally, D is the voter’s social and 
personal gratification (expressive benefits) from voting. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) 
suggest five major forms of social and personal gratification people get from voting: 
complying with civic duty to vote, affirming allegiance to the political system, 
                                                           
10
 The ethical voter hypothesis was first put forward by Goodin and Roberts (1975). Fiorina (1976) first 
proposed the expressive voter hypothesis, although it has received its most extended development by 
Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Brennan and Hamlin (2000) and Schuessler (2000). A discussion of the 
importance of ethical motivations can be found in Blais (2000), who also provides favorable survey 
evidence. 
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affirming a partisan preference, verifying an important role in the political system, and 
displaying general interest in politics. In the calculus-of-voting model, the instrumental 
benefits (B) are contingent on the probability of affecting the outcome of an election, 
whereas consumption benefits (D) do not depend on this contingency. 
Regarding the expected-utility hypothesis, citizens are expected to weight the 
benefits of voting against the costs, and only decide to go and vote when the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Thus, a voter who prefers one of the candidates should vote rather 
than abstain only if R = PB – C + D > 0 or PB + D > C. For those who do not vote, it is 
reasonable to assume that PB +D < C.  Further, assuming that PB ≥ 0 for all voters, one 
can expect that: 
       (i)  if D > C, then the voter always votes; and 
      (ii) if D ≤ C, then the voter votes only if PB > C – D, and he abstains if PB ≤ C – D.  
 
While leaving the other predictions of the expected utility model largely 
unaffected, the addition of consumption benefits (D) to the calculus of voting can 
explain positive turnout levels. However, it does so at a severe price. As any action can 
be explained by making the appropriate assumptions post hoc, the model loses all 
predictive value (Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Mueller, 2003). Importantly, the 
expressive voter hypothesis will necessary be tautological unless we can identify the 
reasons why some people wish to express a preference and others do not. Therefore, 
hereafter it is assume that D = 0. 
Moreover, we suggest extending the traditional rational voter model by including 
the recent developments of the information theory of voter turnout (Matsusaka, 1995). 
The mechanisms of this model can be summarized as follows. In order for a person to 
assess which candidate she prefers, she needs to know what policies each candidate 
plans to implement if elected, and what are the likely consequences of the policies. Her 
information and knowledge about these issues are always incomplete. This implies 
that if she votes for Candidate 1 there is a possibility that she would have preferred to 
vote for Candidate 2 if she had perfect information. If the probability that she is 
making the right voting decision is denoted φ, then it is straightforward to show that B 
in equation (1) is increasing in φ. Roughly speaking, the value of changing the election 
outcome is higher when the voter is more confident that she is electing the right 
candidate. As φ rises, then, she is more likely to vote. The value of φ is shown to be 
increasing in information about candidates and knowledge about how candidates map 
into outcomes.  
Consider an election with two possible outcomes. Call them “Candidate 1 wins” 
and “Candidate 2 wins.” Let V(1) and V(2) be the utilities a person receives if 
Candidate 1 wins and Candidate 2 wins, respectively. These are taken to include all 
forms of payoffs, from government services the individual receives to services to others 
that she likes for altruistic reasons. It is useful to suppose that these payoffs are 
determined according to V(t) = MZ(t) where Z(t) represents the characteristics of 
Candidate t (policies, personal abilities, and so on) and M is the structure of the world, 
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that is, the way candidates map into payoffs. One might think of M as “the model” and 
Z as the inputs.  
Define Z = Z(1) – Z(2) and suppose that M ϵ {-1, 1}. Then a voter favors Candidate 1 
if MZ = 1 and Candidate 2 if MZ = -1. The problem confronting a citizen is that neither 
M nor Z can be observed directly. A voter can never be certain whether MZ = 1 or MZ 
= -1 so she can never be certain of supporting the right candidate. 
This formulation implies that if a person’s vote decides the election, her net payoff 
is 1 if she chooses the right candidate and -1 if she chooses the wrong candidate. Let I 
represent the information a person has about M and Z. The probability that Candidate 
1 is best can be written Pr(MZ = 1|I) and the probability that candidate 2 is best is 
Pr(MZ = -1|I). If she goes to the polls, the person casts her vote for Candidate 1 if 
Pr(MZ = 1|I) > 0.5; otherwise she votes for Candidate 2. Then the probability that the 
candidate who receives her vote is in fact the right candidate for her is: 
φ = max {Pr(MZ = 1|I), Pr(MZ = -1|I)},                                   
The probability that the candidate who receives a person vote is in fact the right 
candidate for her (φ) is called her certainty or confidence about her vote.11 Note that φ 
takes on values between 0.5 and 1. If φ = 1 then she is absolutely certain that she is 
supporting the right candidate, while if φ = 0.5 then she is completely uninformed. A 
more structured formulation of equation (1) can be developed by noting that the 
expected benefit to casting a decisive vote is:  
B = φ (1) + (1-φ) (-1) = 2φ – 1, 
Given that we assume that D = 0, then equation (1) takes the following form: 
                             R = P (2φ – 1) – C,                           (2) 
It follows that the benefit from voting is higher when φ is high, which captures the 
intuition that uncertain voters are hesitant to vote. Moreover, a person’s confidence 
depends on her general knowledge, which gives insight into the true value of the 
model of the world, and raw information, which helps to understand the 
characteristics of the candidates (policies, personal abilities) by delivering a clearer 
signal. This breakdown of information echoes Downs (1957): “The knowledge (a 
person) requires is contextual knowledge as well as information.” In practice, we might 
think of raw information as media coverage of campaigns and general knowledge as 
accumulated learning about history, civics, politics and economics.   
 
Rendering inferences from equation (2) requires measuring each component of the 
model. Therefore, we propose to discuss the main components of the equation (2) in 
the context of national elections in developing countries.  
 
 
                                                           
11
 Note that φ indicates how accurate a voter believes her opinion is, not how accurate it is in an objective 
sense (although the latter probably affects the former).  
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Expected Benefits of Voting (B) 
Based on our theoretical framework, the expected benefits of voting depend on 
three categories of variables. First, a voter’s expected benefits of voting are likely to be 
based on the policy packages that she prefers to be carried out and the parties or 
leaders that she prefers to govern the country. This implies that there should be at least 
one party offering the type of candidates and policies that this particular voter prefers, 
otherwise she will not benefit from voting, and abstaining will be rational (Wessels, 
Schmitt, 2008). Therefore, we suggest that, at the aggregate level, the expected benefits 
of voting derive from having a choice in elections. Indeed, when there is no policy 
package or leader that appeals to citizens, why should they go to the polls? 
Empirically, the expected benefits of voting can be measured by (i) the availability of 
choice and (ii) the match of supply to demand, i.e. whether voters have a party that is 
close to their preferences (Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). The latter is difficult to measure 
at the aggregate level. We can assume that the more differentiated choice options are, 
the higher the chances that there is a party close to voter’s preferences. However, data 
on polarization (range of party positions) are not available for many developing 
countries. Hence we use only fragmentation (number of parties).  
Second, as stressed earlier, B depends on a voter’s confidence that he is voting for 
the right candidate. The voter’s certainty is increasing in his general knowledge and 
information. At the aggregate level, general knowledge can be measured by education 
levels. However, data on educational attainment are not available after 2000. Therefore 
we use literacy rate. Moreover, as mass media is the main source of political 
information, we can assume that as media coverage increases, voter turnout rises. A 
different way to address the role of media is to estimate the different effect on turnout 
of press, radio, and television. Relative to a situation where only print media are 
available, it is plausible to suppose that the price of information is lower if radio also 
becomes available and still lower if television becomes available. Finally, we can 
assume that the quality of information affects the voter’s certainty. Indeed, if people 
don’t have confidence in the information disseminated by the media, they will not use 
it to determinate their vote and their confidence will not improve. From this 
perspective, freedom of the press should increase electoral participation.  
Finally, expected benefits of voting depend on impact uncertainty, i.e. the degree to 
which governments effectively control policy implementation. For example, it has been 
argued that turnout is lower in democracies whose governments are subject to some 
form of external control, such as colonial rule.12 Impact uncertainty is based on voter’s 
evaluations of the extent to which the election outcome will have an impact on actual 
policy-making. If the likelihood of affecting the policy outcome is low, due to low 
executive control of policymaking, the expected benefits of voting are small. In 
developing countries, we argue that executive control might be limited for two 
reasons. New democracies can have high external debts. In addition, executive control 
                                                           
12
 Franklin (2004) provides the example of Malta in his book on voter turnout, arguing that the rise in 
turnout in Malta after 1962 was due to the end of British colonial rule in 1964. 
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of policymaking might also be limited when bureaucracies do not function optimally, 
which might be a problem especially relevant to developing countries, where 
institutions are often less consolidated and levels of corruption tend to be higher.  
 
Probability of Realizing Benefits through the Vote (P) 
Franklin (2004) has pointed out that voters do not know P with certainty, and it is 
precisely the uncertainty that voters face in estimating P that renders it rational to vote. 
Voters’ considerations of the probability that their vote will contribute to their 
preferred election outcome are based on two types of uncertainty: (i) strategic 
uncertainty, and (ii) outcome uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty is the uncertainty 
whether sufficient other co-partisans and sufficiently few opponents will turn out and 
vote to let one’s preferred party win. This type of uncertainty is likely to depend on the 
information that voters receive before the elections about the likely behavior of their 
co-citizens, for example through their social networks and opinion polls. Hence, if 
opinion polls predict that many other citizens will turn out to vote for one’s preferred 
party, rendering winning highly likely, a rational citizen would decide to stay home, 
and vice versa.13 This relates to the second type of uncertainty: outcome uncertainty. 
Outcome uncertainty is defined by voter’s expectation about the election results: if 
uncertainty about the outcome is high, it is more rational to vote. Note that if voters are 
certain that their preferred party will win, or lose, the election, it is irrational for them 
to vote since their vote has no chance to contribute to the outcome of the election. 
Based on these considerations, we expect turnout to be higher if strategic uncertainty 
and outcome uncertainty are high. Empirically, outcome uncertainty can be measured 
by two elements. First, more people vote when the election is close (Blais, 2000). The 
standard indicator for the closeness of the electoral outcome is the difference in vote 
shares between the leading and the second parties. Second, more people vote when 
elections are fair. If elections are fraudulent, people are less likely to vote, knowing that 
their vote is likely to have little bearing on the election outcome. Strategic uncertainty 
seems more difficult to measure empirically at the aggregate level. In the literature on 
turnout, this aspect is often measure by population size, however it seems unlikely that 
voter’s estimates of strategic uncertainty depend on whether all citizens go and vote. 
Rather, strategic uncertainty estimates should be based on expectations of to what 
degree co-partisans and opponents will turn out and vote, which will depend on the 
degree to which citizens are informed through their social networks and opinion polls. 
As urban dwellers are more often directly exposed to candidates and issues, we 
propose to use the degree of urbanization as a proxy for strategic uncertainty.  
 
 
 
                                                           
13
 Note that there is a threshold to this that is defined by outcome uncertainty: if opinions polls show that 
one’s preferred party has such little support in society that it has no chance of winning the elections, 
outcome uncertainty is so low that turning out becomes irrational. 
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Expected Costs of Voting (C) 
Costs of the actual act of voting are registration requirements and the presence of 
sanctions for non-voting in democracies that have compulsory voting. We measure 
registration costs by calculating the proportion of registered voters as compared to the 
voting age population. Though providing an imperfect measure of registration costs, 
this measure can be used for all countries in the sample, even when information on 
registration procedures is scarce. In addition, we suggest that political violence might 
influence voter turnout in developing countries. As stress by Collier and Vicente 
(2008), illicit strategies such as bribery and intimidation were not just widespread but 
were used strategically in the Nigerian presidential election of 2007. They show that 
where a party adopted the strategy of violence it was effective, reducing the turnout of 
those who support other parties. 
 
4.2. Implications 
The above theoretical framework has three general implications for our empirical 
strategy. First, and foremost, we predict that media coverage and freedom foster voter 
turnout in developing countries. Moreover, we suggest that radio might have a larger 
impact on electoral participation than newspapers since it reduces the price of 
acquiring and processing information. Second, we expect the calculus of voting to 
function in the same way in developing countries than in developed countries. Hence 
we expect to find higher turnout in developing countries if benefits and outcome 
uncertainty are high, and low turnout if costs are high. Finally, apart from the variables 
affecting the calculus of voting identified in the existing literature, we expect several 
additional variables to play a role in developing countries. These are political violence, 
fairness of elections and limits of executive control indicated by high external debt and 
poor quality of bureaucracy. We expect to find higher turnout if political violence is 
low, elections are fair and executive control of policymaking is high. Appendix 1 
summarizes our theoretical predictions.   
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we test our theoretical predictions, focusing essentially on media 
coverage and freedom. We describe the data and discuss econometric issues. Then, we 
present our empirical results.  
 
5.1. Variables and Data 
The models used in much of the literature on voter turnout are cross-sectional in 
nature, insofar as mean turnout across a series of elections is depicted as a function of 
mean levels of the independent variables. Under this approach, scholars use data 
associated with each election for the time period under study, calculate the mean value 
for each variable, and then estimate a regression model with one observation for each 
national unit. Such an approach is somewhat limited since there is covariation in 
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turnout and key independent variables that occurs within countries over time.14 In this 
study, we use a pooled cross-sectional time-series model, whereby turnout in each 
country and each year is depicted as a function of independent variables measured at 
the time of each election. Hence it is possible to explain variation in turnout both across 
time and across countries. We have been able to collect data for 307 elections held in 60 
developing countries between 1980 and 2005.15 As a measure of voter turnout, we use 
the percentage of the voting age population who cast a vote in national elections from 
1980 to 2005, from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA). Appendix 2 provides an overview of the countries and elections years 
included in the sample.  
The main independent variables of interest are media freedom and media access. 
As a measure of media freedom, we use Freedom House’s media freedom score for 
each country. Freedom House assigns points to countries on the basis of three, equally-
weighted categories related to media’s independence from government. These three 
categories are: (i) legal environment, which looks at laws, statues, constitutional 
provisions, and regulations that enable or restrict the media’s ability to operate freely 
in a country; (ii) political environment, which evaluates the degree of political control 
over the content of news media in each country (such as editorial independence, 
official or unofficial censorship, harassment or attacks against journalists); (iii) 
economic environment, which includes the structure of media ownership, media-
related infrastructure, its concentration, the impact of corruption or bribery on news 
media content, and the selective withholding or bestowal of subsidies or other sources 
of financial revenue on some media outlets by the state. This index considers TV, radio, 
newspaper, and the Internet. 
To measure media coverage, we use three different variables with data from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003) and the UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics. Press coverage is measured by daily newspapers average circulation per 1000 
inhabitants.16 For radio coverage, we use the number of radio receivers per 1000 
inhabitants. Television coverage is measured by the number of television sets per 1000 
inhabitants. 
With respect to the other independent variables, benefits are also measured by 
fragmentation at the time of the elections. We measure fragmentation by the number of 
parties running in the election which obtained at least 1% of votes, with data from the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Database of political 
Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank (Beck and al., 2001). We use literacy rate as a 
                                                           
14
 Other studies use survey data. However, there is a methodological challenge stemming from the 
sampling bias in survey research: survey respondents tend to vote at a higher rate than the real population. 
Indeed, non-voters tend to be more difficult to interview and some non-voters claim in surveys that they 
in fact have voted (Lutz, Marsh, 2007). 
15
 Data on turnout are available before 1980. However, given the availability of data on media coverage 
and media freedom, we have to restrict our study to elections held after 1980.   
16
 Newspapers’ circulation is the number of copies distributed on average per day. Circulation is not 
always the same as copies sold, often called paid circulation, since some newspapers are distributed at no 
cost.  
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proxy for education, with data from the World Bank Indicators. Executive control of 
policymaking is measured by the external debt GDP ratio (World Bank Indicators) and 
the quality of bureaucracy (International Country Risk Guide). 
The probability that voting will contribute to the preferred election outcome of 
voters is tested by impact uncertainty and outcome uncertainty. We use the degree of 
urbanization (WDI) as a proxy for impact uncertainty. Outcome uncertainty is 
measured by the closeness of elections, i.e. the difference in vote shares between the 
leading and second parties in each election. As data are not easily available for 
developing countries, we gather data from several sources: Inter Parliamentary Union 
(IPU), Elections around the World web site, International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Database of Political Institutions (World Bank). 
Outcome uncertainty is also measured by the fairness of elections. We introduce a 
dummy variable from the Database of Political Institutions that equals one when vote 
fraud or candidate intimidation is serious enough to affect the elections outcome. 
Regarding the costs of voting, registration costs are measured by the proportion of 
registered voters as compared to the voting age population, with data from IDEA. 
Information on compulsory voting legislation is also collected from IDEA. 
Traditionally scholars have relied on a simple binary variable to measure compulsory 
voting laws, coded one in those country-year cases for which compulsory voting laws 
are present and zero otherwise. However, such a measure does not capture the full 
range of variation in types of compulsory voting across countries, since the 
enforcement of mandatory voting laws varies widely.17 We hypothesize that turnout 
will be highest when compulsory voting is accompanied by credible sanctions against 
noncompliance. To capture these effects, we develop a 4-point scale of compulsory 
voting. Countries with voluntary voting are scored as 0, countries with compulsory 
voting mandate but no sanctions against nonvoters written into law are scored as 1, 
compulsory systems possessing such legal sanctions but leaving them generally 
unenforced are scored as 2, and compulsory systems with legal sanctions that are 
enforced in practice are scored as 3. Appendix 2 presents the score for each country in 
the sample. Finally, political violence is captured by introducing a dummy variable 
that equals one during civil war and zero otherwise as provided by the PRIO Armed 
Conflict database. Appendix 3 presents the variables and their sources in detail. 
 
5.2. Empirical Specification 
The basic specification takes the following form: 
         TURNi,t = α + βInfoi,t + θXi,t +τi + ui,t           (3)  
where i = 1,…N denotes countries and t = 1,…T denotes elections. TURNi,t stands for 
voter turnout rate in each ith country and each tth election. The main variable of 
                                                           
17
 For example, in some countries, citizens are required to vote only if they register, but registration is not 
mandatory and the punishment for not voting is only a nominal fine. In other nations the law is taken 
much more seriously. In Peru, for instance, voters must carry a card for two months following an election 
to prove they have voted and may be denied access to public services if they do not.  
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interest is Infoi,t, which captures the influence of mass media. We will test the three 
types of media, as well as media freedom. τi and ui,t are respectively country fixed 
effects and the error term. Finally, Xi,t is a vector of control variables. Among them, we 
include the variables that affect the calculus of voting as identified in our theoretical 
framework and described previously. In addition, we include other political and 
economic variables that are likely to affect voter turnout.18 We control for the level of 
development, measured by real per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The 
standard hypothesis to be tested is that economic development fosters turnout. The 
reasoning underlying this hypothesis is that economic development makes people 
more informed and engaged in the political process (Powell, 1982). It may not be only 
the level of economic development that matters but also the economic conjuncture at 
the time of the election. However, its effect on turnout is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
Rosenstone (1982) argues that economic adversity depresses turnout, because it 
disrupts the kind of social relationships that nurture political participation and induces 
people to withdraw from politics and focus on their personal concerns. On the other 
hand, Radcliff (1992) suggests that economic conjuncture affects turnout rates in 
developing countries differently than in industrialized democracies. In developing 
countries, economic performance is “inversely related to turnout so that when things 
are bad, citizens tend to vote in great numbers” (p. 445). Indeed, “the absence of 
security provisions leaves economic discontent to be politicized” (p. 446). Our indicator 
of economic conjuncture is the increase or decrease in per capita GDP in the election 
year, compared to the previous year. Finally, we control for the electoral system. The 
standard assumption is that turnout tends to be higher in proportional systems, for any 
of the following three reasons (Blais, Carty, 1990). First, it’s a fairer system; people feel 
less alienated and are thus more inclined to vote. Second, proportional system 
increases the number of parties and the variety of options among which people can 
choose. Third, proportional system makes elections more competitive: as there are 
many members to be collected in each district, most parties have a chance to win at 
least one seat, and as a consequence they attempt to mobilize electors throughout the 
country. Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Appendix 4. 
Equation (3) can best be estimated as a panel, either using fixed effects or random 
effects. Both methods have their own assumptions. Using a random effects model 
assumes that all explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the individual specific 
effects. This is less likely for the empirical problem at hand. The fixed effects model 
control for omitted time-invariant country characteristics. However, a disadvantage of 
fixed effects model is that the impact of time-invariant or slowly changing variables 
such as institutional variables cannot be estimated. This is a cost in the context of this 
study since we are interested in the marginal effects of some time-invariant factors, 
such as electoral system and compulsory voting. 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) derive an instrumental variables estimator that is 
between a fixed and a random effects approach. It allows the estimation of time 
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 Appendix 3 presents these variables and their sources in detail. 
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invariant effects, without imposing the strong assumption that all variables should be 
uncorrelated with the individual specific effects. In the Hausman and Taylor (HT) 
model, exogenous variables (both time-variant and time-invariant) serve as their own 
instruments, time-varying endogenous effects (in the sense that they are correlated 
with individual specific effects) are instrumented by their deviation from individual 
means, and time-invariant endogenous effects are instrumented by individual averages 
of time-varying exogenous variables. The main challenge in the Hausman and Taylor 
model is deciding which of the variables are correlated with the individual specific 
effects and which are not. For this, Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest mainly using 
economic intuition. If a variable is possibly correlated with other political, social, 
historical, cultural or economic aspects not included in the model, it is probably 
endogenous. In our specification, GDP per capita, electoral system, and our variables 
of media penetration and freedom can on this basis be considered as endogenous. 
Besides economic intuition, formal tests can help decide what model to use and 
which variables to consider as exogenous. Specifically, Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte 
(2003) provide a pretest estimator based on Hausman (1978) to choose between the 
fixed effects, random effects and HT estimator. Using this pretest estimator, we find 
that the HT model is preferred to the fixed effects model, which in turn is preferred to 
the random effects model. Nevertheless, to show robustness, we did conduct besides 
the HT model fixed effects panel regression results and we compare the regression 
results of the two models.  
The Hausman specification test (1978) can also be used to decide which variables 
are to be treated as endogenous in the HT model. To apply this test, we rank on the 
basis of economic intuition variables from least to most exogenous. We next, following 
this list, instrument one variable at the time, up to the point where the Hausman test 
suggests that the HT model is no longer the most suited model. Using this method, we 
find that GDP per capita, electoral system, the variables of media penetration and 
freedom, and external debt can be considered endogenous, and the remaining 
variables exogenous. 
 
5.3. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present the results of the fixed effects and Hausman Taylor 
models. We first focus on the impact of media coverage on voter turnout. Then, we 
introduce the quality of information, as measured by the Freedom House index of 
media freedom. 
 
5.3.1. Media Access and Voter Turnout 
Table 1 below presents the basic results. We consider the effects of the three media 
variables defined in Section 5.1, namely newspapers circulation, radio receivers and 
television sets, expressed per 1000 inhabitants. A number of results stand out. First, as 
predicted, the three media variables have a positive effect on voter turnout in 
developing countries. Second, only the coefficient on radio ownership is statistically 
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significant. We suggest that this result is not surprising. Radio reduces the price of 
political information. Moreover, as citizens don’t have to be able to read, they can more 
easily process information. To sum up, radio seems the best mean to acquire and 
process information necessary to decide how to vote in developing countries. 
Considering the effects of the other elements in the calculus of voting model, the 
coefficients on fragmentation are positive but small and not statistically significant. We 
predicted that fragmentation increases the expected benefits of voting as more voters 
can find a party that matches their preferences. However, fragmentation also increases 
the complexity of the political system, which is why we don’t find a significant positive 
impact on voter turnout. Literacy fosters turnout in developing countries. This 
confirms our prediction that education reduces the costs to process information. 
Finally, executive control seems to have the expected effect on turnout: as external debt 
is higher, turnout tends to be lower.  
Turning to outcome uncertainty, both indicators, closeness and fairness, have the 
expected sign. This confirms our expectations that turnout is higher when outcome 
uncertainty is higher. Though not significant, closeness has a consistently negative 
coefficient in all models. Since a smaller value of closeness indicates closer, more 
competitive elections, this demonstrates that the closer are elections, the higher is 
turnout, confirming earlier findings in the literature on turnout in established 
democracies. In addition, electoral fraud has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on turnout. Hence, when voters face the choice of voting in elections that they 
consider unfair, they are less likely to turn out and vote, knowing that their vote is 
likely to have little bearing on the election outcome.  
Considering the effects of costs on turnout, two results stand out. First, compulsory 
voting boosts turnout. Second, political violence negatively affects turnout in 
developing countries. Hence the security situation during the elections is an important 
determinant of electoral participation as violence increases the costs of voting 
associated with traveling to the polls.   
Finally, the results concerning the control variables are interesting. First, economic 
development, measured by GDP per capita, seems to facilitate turnout in developing 
countries. Second, economic conjuncture doesn’t impact significantly electoral 
participation. Moreover, contrary to Radcliff’s (1992) argument that the relationship 
between economic growth and turnout will be negative in developing countries, we 
find that economic growth is positively related to turnout. Finally, proportional system 
has a clear positive and significant effect on electoral participation.   
 
5.3.2. Media Freedom and Voter Turnout 
We now investigate the effect of the quality of information on voter turnout in 
developing countries. We introduce the Freedom House index on media freedom in 
the basic specification. Table 2 below presents the results of the fixed effects and 
Hausman Taylor models.  
 
24 
 
 
 
Table 1: Media Coverage and Electoral Participation 
 
Variables 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
HT 
(3) 
FE 
(4) 
HT 
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
HT 
Fragmentation 0.072  
(0.53) 
0.112 
(0.63) 
0.072 
(0.54) 
0.113 
(0.62) 
0.072 
(0.53) 
0.115 
(0.63) 
Literacy 0.820 
(1.85)* 
1.002 
(1.90)* 
0.814 
(1.85)* 
1.005 
(1.90)* 
0.819 
(1.85)* 
1.005 
(1.90)* 
Newspapers 0.755 
(1.12) 
0.890 
(1.32) 
    
Radio 
  
1.134 
(2.56)** 
1.255 
(2.60)** 
  
TV 
    
0.854 
(1.30) 
0.921 
(1.31) 
Debt -0.200 
(1.81)* 
-0.321 
(1.85)* 
-0.215 
(1.81)* 
-0.213 
(1.81)* 
-0.224 
(1.84)* 
-0.324 
(1.84)* 
Bureaucracy quality 0.741 
(1.20) 
1.850 
(1.12) 
0.745 
(1.25) 
1.875 
(1.13) 
0.745 
(1.21) 
1.875 
(1.15) 
Closeness -0.100 
(1.20) 
-0.123 
(1.29) 
-0.110 
(1.30) 
-0.125 
(1.69) 
-0.109 
(1.60) 
-0.125 
(1.69) 
Electoral Fraud -1.005 
(1.94)* 
-1.115 
(1.90)* 
-1.005 
(1.94)* 
-1.115 
(1.91)* 
-1.004 
(1.94)* 
-1.114 
(1.91)* 
Urbanization 0.100 
(0.75) 
0.125 
(0.70) 
0.100 
(0.74) 
0.125 
(0.71) 
0.101 
(0.74) 
0.125 
(0.74) 
Registration costs -0.450 
(1.10) 
-0.756 
(1.00) 
-0.450 
(1.11) 
-0.755 
(1.01) 
-0.450 
(1.11) 
-0.755 
(1.01) 
Compulsory voting 
 
9.785 
(3.88)*** 
 
9.560 
(3.08)*** 
 
9.544 
(3.11)*** 
Violence -0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.752 
(1.82)* 
-0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.753 
(1.83)* 
-0.452 
(1.85)* 
-0.755 
(1.85)* 
GDP per capita (log) 1.630 
(1.76)* 
1.547 
(1.80)* 
1.630 
(1.80)* 
1.545 
(1.81)* 
1.631 
(1.76)* 
1.546 
(1.80)* 
Change in per capita GDP 0.400 
(0.89) 
0.456 
(0.86) 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.87) 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.91) 
Proportional system 
 
1.856 
(2.31)** 
 
1.963 
(2.20)** 
 
1.865 
(2.40)** 
Constant 6.505 
(2.51)** 
7.401 
(2.54)** 
7.560 
(2.50)** 
8.120 
(2.58)** 
7.650 
(2.55)** 
8.630 
(2.54)** 
R2 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 
Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Observations 307 307 307 307 307 307 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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       Table 2: Media Freedom and Electoral Participation 
 (1) (2) 
Variables FE HT 
Fragmentation 0.075 
(0.54) 
0.116 
(0.62) 
Literacy 0.815 
(1.85)* 
1.015 
(1.90)* 
Radio 
 
1.004 
(2.46)** 
1.015 
(2.50)** 
Media freedom 
 
1.530 
(1.86)* 
1.632 
(1.84)* 
Debt 
 
-0.225 
(1.81)* 
-0.215 
(1.81)* 
Bureaucracy quality 
 
0.745 
(1.25) 
1.875 
(1.13) 
Closeness 
 
-0.116 
(1.40) 
-0.125 
(1.59) 
Electoral Fraud 
 
-1.015 
(1.84)* 
-1.115 
(1.91)* 
Urbanization 
 
0.100 
(0.75) 
0.125 
(0.71) 
Registration costs 
 
-0.450 
(1.01) 
-0.755 
(1.00) 
Compulsory voting 
 
 
9.550 
(3.08)*** 
Violence 
 
-0.458 
(1.86)* 
-0.753 
(1.83)* 
GDP per capita (log) 
 
1.632 
(1.80)* 
1.545 
(1.81)* 
Change in per capita GDP 
 
0.402 
(0.90) 
0.455 
(0.87) 
Proportional system 
 
 
1.903 
(2.20)** 
Constant 
 
7.960 
(2.51)** 
8.300 
(2.58)** 
R2 0.56 0.56 
Countries 60 60 
Observations 307 307 
    Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Two main results stand out. First, the impact of media freedom on voter turnout is 
consistent with our theoretical framework. It is large, positive and highly significant, 
even after controlling for a large set of variables. When mass media are freer, citizens 
participate politically and vote more. We suggest that media-provided information has 
higher value to citizens when government doesn’t interfere with the media. Therefore, 
citizens are more prone to use this information to decide how to vote. Second, the 
26 
 
coefficients on radio ownership remain positive and statistically significant. Taken 
together, our findings suggest that both the amount and the quality of information 
affect positively electoral participation in developing countries. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
Making governments more accountable and responsive to the needs of people is 
one of the most fundamental concerns of scholars and development practitioners. 
Obviously, competitive elections are a necessary component in the sequence of changes 
that lead to government accountability. In this paper, we argue that elections are an 
effective mechanism to discipline governments only if individuals show up at the polls 
to express their views. We offer a comprehensive analysis of voter turnout in 
developing countries and put light on the role of media-provided information. Our 
findings suggest that media penetration, measured by radio ownership, fosters 
electoral participation in developing countries, whereas newspapers circulation and 
television ownership don’t have a significant impact. In addition, we show that when 
government owns a larger share of media outlets and infrastructure, regulates the 
media industry more, and does more to control the content of news, citizens are less 
politically active.   
 Our findings complement the recent literature on the role of mass media for 
development in two aspects. First, we suggest that both media coverage and freedom 
matter. Citizens need not only to have access to information but also to have 
confidence in media-provided information. When they have politically relevant 
information, citizens are more politically active. Second, radio seems the best mean to 
acquire and process information necessary to decide how to vote in developing 
countries.  
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Appendix 1: The Determinants of Electoral Participation in Developing Countries:  
           Theoretical Predictions and Open Questions  
 
Variables 
 
Higher Turnout Lower Turnout 
Benefits B   
Fragmentation x  
Education x  
Media coverage x  
Media freedom x  
External debt  x 
Bureaucracy quality x  
Probability P   
Closeness of elections x  
Fairness of elections x  
Urbanization x  
Costs C   
Registration costs  x 
Compulsory voting x  
Violence  x 
Control variables   
Income x  
Change in GDP  ? 
Proportional rule x  
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Appendix 2: Sample Characteristics 
Countries Elections Dates 
Compulsory 
Votinga 
Countries Elections Dates 
Compulsory 
Votinga 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Croatia 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
Kenya 
91, 95, 97, 99, 2002, 2004 
83, 89, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 86, 88, 91, 96, 2001 
81, 86, 91, 94, 99, 2003 
84, 89, 93, 98, 2003 
91, 96, 2001 
80, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2002, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 89, 94, 98, 2002 
91, 92, 96, 97, 2001, 2005 
93, 2005 
88, 92, 97, 2002, 2004 
89, 93, 99, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 91, 94, 98, 2002 
82, 86, 90, 94, 98, 2002 
92, 95, 97, 2000, 2005 
82, 86, 90, 96, 2000, 2004 
84, 88, 92, 96, 98, 2002 
84, 87, 90, 95, 2000, 2005 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
92, 2000, 2005 
82, 87, 92, 96, 2001 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
82, 85, 90, 91, 95, 99, 2003 
81, 85, 89, 93, 97, 2001, 2005 
90, 94, 98, 2002 
80, 84, 89, 91, 96, 98, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2004 
89, 93, 97, 2003 
92, 97, 2002 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Papua New G. 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Sri Lanka 
Togo 
Thailand 
Trinidad & T. 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
93, 98, 2002 
94, 99, 2004 
82, 86, 90, 95, 99, 2004 
92, 97, 2002 
92, 96, 2001, 2003 
83, 87, 91, 95, 2000, 2005 
82, 88, 94, 2000 
94, 99, 2004 
81, 86, 91, 94, 97, 99 
84, 90, 96, 2001 
93, 95, 96, 99, 2004 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
82, 87, 92, 97, 2002 
85, 88, 90, 93, 97, 2002 
80, 85, 90, 95, 2000, 2001 
87, 92, 95, 98, 2001, 2004 
90, 95, 2000, 2005 
92, 96, 2000, 2004 
91, 96, 2000, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 96, 2000 
82, 88, 94, 99, 2005 
85, 90, 94, 98, 2003, 2005 
83, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 2001, 2005 
81, 86, 91, 95, 2000, 2001, 2006 
81, 86, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 87, 91, 95, 99, 2002 
84, 89, 94, 99, 2004 
83, 88, 93, 98, 2000 
91, 96, 2001   
80, 85, 90, 96, 2002 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
3 
1 
0 
0 
a Countries with voluntary voting are scored as 0, countries with compulsory voting mandate but no sanctions against nonvoters 
written into law are scored as 1, compulsory systems possessing such legal sanctions but leaving them generally unenforced are 
scored as 2, and compulsory systems with legal sanctions that are enforced in practice are scored as 3. 
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Appendix 3: Data Description 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Indicators 
 
Sources 
Voter Turnout 
Percentage of voters on voting age 
population 
International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
 
Independent Variables 
 
  
Benefits B   
Availability of choice   
Fragmentation The number of parties running in the 
election which obtained at least 1% of 
votes 
Database of Political Institutions  
(World Bank) 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES) 
Voter’s confidence   
Literacy The proportion of the population aged 
15 years and older that can read and 
write 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Media coverage Daily newspapers: average circulation 
per 1000 inhabitants 
 
Radio receivers per 1000 inhabitants 
 
Television sets per 1000 inhabitants 
 
 
 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
World bank (WDI) 
Media freedom Freedom House index of media 
freedom. Each country is rated in 
three areas of potential state influence 
over the media: legal environment, 
political influences and economic 
pressures, to determine an overall 
score. Score rescaled from 0 to 1 
where a higher score means more 
freedom. 
 
 
 
 
Freedom House 
Executive control   
External debt External debt as % of GDP World Bank (WDI) 
Bureaucracy quality Bureaucracy index scored from 0 to 6. 
High scores indicate autonomy from 
political pressure, strength and 
expertise to govern, established 
mechanisms for recruiting and 
training  
 
 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
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                        Appendix 3 (continued) 
Probability P   
Outcome uncertainty   
 
Closeness of elections 
 
The difference in vote shares between 
the leading and the second parties 
IDEA 
Database of Political Institutions (World Bank)
IPU PARLINE Database 
Elections around the World web site 
Fairness of elections A dummy that equals one when vote 
fraud or candidate intimidation is 
serious enough to affect the elections 
outcome  
 
Database of Political Institutions (World bank) 
Strategic uncertainty   
Urbanization Percentage of the total population 
living in the urban areas. 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Costs C   
Registration costs Percentage of individuals registered 
over the voting age population 
IDEA 
 
Compulsory voting 
 
Degree to which appearance at the 
polls is mandated by the state. 
Countries with voluntary voting 
receive a score of 0, countries with a 
compulsory voting statute but no 
sanctions written into law receive a 
score of 1, compulsory systems 
possessing such legal sanctions but 
leaving them generally unenforced 
receive a score of 2, and compulsory 
systems with legal sanctions that are 
enforced in practice receive a score of 
3.  
 
IDEA 
 
Political violence 
 
A dummy equals one during civil 
war. 
 
PRIO Armed Conflict database 
   
Control variables   
Income Real GDP per capita in constant 1995 
US dollars 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Electoral system A dummy variable which equals one 
when the election was held under the 
proportional representation rule 
 
Database of political Institutions (World Bank)
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 Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Turnout 307 57 14 30 91 
Fragmentation 307 3.75 1.75 2 8 
Literacy 307 70 35.7 55 90 
Newspapers (per 1000) 307 142.44 85.5 2 400 
Radio (per 1000) 307 150 90.7 3 720 
Television (per 1000) 307 130 80.1 1 620 
Media freedom 307 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.9 
Bureaucracy quality 307 3.1 1.7 0.5 5 
Closeness 307 9.70 8.02 0.6 35 
Fairness 307 0.52 0.49 0 1 
Urbanization 307 47.5 25.10 10 85 
Registration costs 307 65 20.7 30 95 
Compulsory voting 307 0.45 1.05 0 3 
Political violence 307 0.15 0.32 0 1 
Income per capita 307 4061 3201 171 18390 
Proportional system 307 0.60 0.3 0 1 
 
